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Background
 Norsk
Hydro's Heavy Water Plant at Vemork in Rjukan was destroyed by Norwegian
saboteurs in February 1943. This sabotage was widely known about in
Norway as well as abroad. A side from this successful sabotage of the plant, another unsuccessful one had been attempted earlier, of which much less was known. Nonetheless it is an important event for the Dalane district and deserves our attention. There are people still living in the area who can tell about some of the campaign. The informants were not only willing to tell about what they had heard or seen, but were also able to point out the places where the tragedies took place, as well as convey some of the atmosphere at the various scenes of the drama. This endeavour, named Operation Freshman, is of importance to world history, because it is related to the two sides' race to produce the atom bomb. In addition, the Freshman case demonstrated the effects of Hitler's famous "Führerbefehl" (Führer's order), not only on its participants but also on the Fuhrer's own officers and soldiers. The world-historical aspects of the case require an examination of this, but only to the degree that it serves for placing local history into correct perspective. After presenting a picture of the drama, it could have been tempting to analyse the major aspects of Operation Freshman. This, however, would have made it too lengthy and would not have served the purpose. The main objective has been to gather, analyse and present material about a dramatic aspect of regional history which should not be forgotten. At the beginning of 1942 the allied intelligence services received reports indicating that the German's had ordered a three-fold increase in the production of heavy water. Heavy water was an important ingredient in the production of the atom bomb, and the German's main production site was the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork. It now became extremely important for the Britons to destroy this production capacity. Three methods were considered: 1. Aerial bombing. 2. Sabotage by Norwegian agents. 3. Attack by English airborne troops. The first alternative was eliminated because of the difficulty of localising the area, and also the large civilian losses that such a bombing would cause. Attack by Norwegian saboteurs was also eliminated, possibly because the British had not as yet found Norwegians they considered up to such a mission. The third alternative was chosen and the operation assigned to the First British Airborne Division. All the participants were volunteers, in spite of initial ignorance about what the operation meant. The group would be landed by glider, for which technical considerations required a crew of 12 to 15 men. Because of the perilousness as well as the importance of the mission, it was decided to double the effort. The unit finally consisted of two gliders, each of which should carry one officer, one sergeant, thirteen army engineers and two glider pilots. They would use Horsa MK 1 gliders. The two commanders of the attack force, one in each glider, were Lieutenant Allen and Lieutenant Methven. The tow planes were to be two Halifax airplanes, each with a seven-member flight crew. The commander of the operation was Captain Cooper, who had the ultimate responsibility in deciding the actual time of departure, within a time frame fixed between the 18th and the 29th November, 1942. At that time the moon would provide enough light into the Rjukan valley for the attack forces to be able to maneouver. The gliders were to land at the Skoglands marshes by Møsvatn lake. Four Norwegian resistance workers of the Linge group were to be waiting. These men were lens Anton Poulsson, Arne Kjelstrup, Knut Haugland and Klaus Helberg. Their task was to receive the attack forces and lead them safely to the target. After completing their mission, those Britons who were able to do so were to attempt to cross the Swedish border. If any of the army engineers were wounded during the attack, they were to be given a shot of morphine and left behind, a decision which they all understood. Training  The
engineers who were to carry out the attack took part in a month-long
training programme. To divert attention from the actual purpose of the
mission, the training was claimed to be a competition with American
troops, the Washington Cup. The entire training programme took place
under cover of this competition. Security remained good and the security
police who advised the crew never heard a word from outsiders about
the real purpose of the operation. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Henniker headed the training programme and planned the operation. Initially, however, he was somewhat doubtful of the enterprise as he felt that it did not meet wartime legal standards, and also that the distance from home base in Scotland to the landing area on the Hardanger plateau was far too great. Henniker also claimed that the navigation training received by RAF personnel was not good enough. He considered the mission difficult, although not impossible. In spite of these reservations the Lieutenant Colonel carried out his task, but he was not aware of the actual importance of the operation. As Henniker said in an NRK interview in 1983: "I was told it was extremely important. I was told it was in order to prevent the manufacture of heavy water, which I was told was connected with something far more important. Though I did not know then what it was." The first week of training consisted of drills, weapons practice, map reading and long marches. Special emphasis was laid on the soldiers' observation skills. The second week was used for mountain climbing in North Wales, where they also did long marches across mountainous terrain using small-scale maps, and where they camped out in all sorts of weather while living on meagre rations. The third week was used for technical training including a visit to English and Scottish heavy water plants similar to the one in Norway. During the last week the group was outfitted with special equipment and a "dress rehearsal" of the entire plan was conducted. Three days before departure for Norway, the special forces returned to home base in Scotland, from where they would set out on their mission.  The
flight crew was also given special training. The pilots had flown Whitleys
and Wellingtons, but now had to acquaint themselves with Halifax planes.
They also needed to practice towing Horsa gliders, an exercise which
could only approximate the actual 650 kilometre long night-time tow
under conditions unfamiliar to the pilots of the gliders as well as
themselves, who in addition had to be prepared to land under cover of
darkness in unknown terrain. The attempt Operation Freshman was a gamble, with the greatest danger factor represented by the weather. The chosen day of departure was Thursday, 19 November 1942. The Britons had already brought from London to Scotland a Norwegian meteorologist, Lieutenant Colonel Sverre Pettersen. He was to assist the Britons in forecasting the weather across the North Sea. Pettersen drew up certain charts and found that the forecast for 19 November was rather poor. Pettersen advised the leaders to postpone the operation a few days, awaiting an improvement in the weather. Weather conditions at the landing site inland on the Hardanger plateau, however, were ideal. The Britons opted for take off as planned and the Freshman report of 1946 stated that the forecast for the night between 19 and 20 November was relatively good, with chances of rapid change as soon as the planes reached the Norwegian mountain range. The first tow plane with glider took off from the Skitten airfield near Wick in Scotland at 17.50 hours on Thursday, 19 November. The other unit left twenty minutes later. Five minutes before midnight a signal from the radio operator in the first plane was heard at home base. The report went out that the glider had been released above the coastline.  |